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Revisiting the North Carolina Business Court 
After Twenty Years 
GREGORY DAY* 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past two decades, almost half of all states have enacted business 
courts to assume jurisdiction over locally arising business disputes.  
Advocates of these new courts assert that by trying business disputes in a 
specialized forum using an expert jurist, these venues should improve the 
adjudication of local business conflicts, while developing the states’ 
business climate.  Considering that a majority of Fortune 500 companies 
are incorporated in Delaware, where the state’s esteemed Court of 
Chancery hears all local corporate disputes, out-of-state businesses may 
become more likely to incorporate or relocate to a state that has enacted a 
business court.  Most academics, however, refute that these nascent 
business courts will generate tangible benefits.  Their first point is that 
business courts differ substantially from Delaware’s Court of Chancery.  
The second argument is that business courts are not nearly as established 
or reputable as the Chancery Court.  It is also argued that companies are 
not nearly as concerned with a state’s legal landscape as they are with 
other factors, and thus, should be unlikely to migrate to another state for 
the sake of a business court.  Indeed, these competing narratives raise 
important questions about the ability of states and their court systems to 
improve business adjudication and to build local value. 
 
The North Carolina Business Court is one of the most reputable and 
established of these new specialty courts.  Having been established almost 
twenty years ago, the North Carolina Business Court should provide 
meaningful insights into this debate regarding the benefits of having a 
business court.  Using both statistical and anecdotal evidence, this Article 
explores whether business courts have improved, or are likely to improve, 
American business jurisprudence.  Alternatively, this Article explores 
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whether business courts can help states to compete against Delaware’s 
corporate monopoly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the North Carolina Business Court’s inception, local leadership 
suggested that the state could benefit from a forum specifically designed to 
adjudicate complex business disputes.1  This prediction often rested upon 
the belief that Delaware’s corporate prominence is attributable to its 
esteemed Court of Chancery, which the North Carolina Business Court 
hoped to replicate.2  Indeed, Delaware’s Chancery Court was one of the 
 
 1. The North Carolina Business Court circulated a list that enumerated several 
possible methods by which it may improve local jurisprudence, including “speed and 
flexibility,” “specialization,” and “predictability.”  About the Court, N.C. BUS. CT., 
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/history.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2015); see also Carrie A. 
O’Brien, Note, The North Carolina Business Court: North Carolina’s Special Superior 
Court for Complex Business Cases, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 367, 367 (2002) (recounting that 
during the Business Court’s inception, “[s]tate officials believe[d] the Business Court 
[would] attract out-of-state businesses to the state by developing their understanding of 
North Carolina corporate law” (citing Jacqueline Bueno, North Carolina to Establish 
Business Court, WALL ST. J. (Southeast ed.), Oct. 25, 1995, at S1)). 
 2. See Andrew R. Jones, Note, Toward a Stronger Economic Future for North 
Carolina: Precedent and the Opinions of the North Carolina Business Court, 6 ELON L. 
REV. 189, 196–97 (2014) (noting that the Annual Report of the North Carolina Commission 
on Business Laws and the Economy, which advocated for the creation of the Business 
Court, explicitly cited the relationship between the well-regarded Delaware Court of 
2
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first, and currently is the premier, of specialty courts exercising plenary 
jurisdiction over statewide corporate disputes.3  This forum has helped 
Delaware to become a particularly attractive corporate environment,4 as 
evidenced by the number of Fortune 500 companies5 incorporated in the 
state.6  At least twenty-two other states have sought to capture some of 
 
Chancery and the decisions of many large companies to incorporate in Delaware as a 
desirable outcome (citing ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON 
BUSINESS LAWS AND THE ECONOMY 8 (1995) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT])).  The 
Commission Report stated: 
The Delaware Chancery Court is one reason many Fortune 500 companies choose 
to incorporate in that state.  That court provides a high level of judicial expertise 
on corporate law issues.  It has developed a substantial body of corporate law that 
provides predictability for business decision-making.  Corporations litigating a 
corporate legal issue in the Delaware Chancery Court get a timely and well-
reasoned written decision from an expert judge. 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra, at 8; see also Lauren K. Ohnesorge, The Goal of N.C.’s 
Business Court Modernization Bill, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (Aug. 8, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://www. 
bizjournals.com/triangle/blog/techflash/2014/08/nc-business-court-modernization-bill.html 
(explaining that the North Carolina Business Court was designed to mimic key functions of 
the Delaware Court of Chancery in an effort to attract corporate charters). 
 3. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in 
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5–8 (1995) (discussing the history of the 
Chancery Court); Anne Tucker Nees, Making a Case for Business Courts: A Survey of and 
Proposed Framework to Evaluate Business Courts, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 477, 480 (2007) 
(referring to the Court of Chancery as the “godfather” of today’s business courts (first citing 
William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery—1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819 (1993); then citing E. Norman Veasey & 
Michael P. Dooley, The Role of Corporate Litigation in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 131 (2000))). 
 4. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate 
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 725–26 (2002) (arguing that Delaware’s reputation and 
capability has been built largely upon its longevity, considering that the court has developed 
substantial corporate case law in comparison to other states (citing Ehud Kamar, A 
Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
1908, 1928–32 (1998))). 
 5. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and 
Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 886–87 (1990) (citing Letter from Joseph Grundfest, 
Comm’r, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, to David Brown, Sec’y, Council of the 
Corporate Law Section of the Del. State Bar Ass’n (Dec. 10, 1987)). 
 6. See id. at 893–94.  Alva recounts several theories of why the Court of Chancery 
attracts outside corporations, but finds: 
The most detailed explanation of Delaware’s success in the charter market is 
[Roberta] Romano’s.  She concludes that Delaware’s success is a result of: (a) 
comprehensive statutes and a body of case law, which provide greater certainty of 
legal outcome; (b) an experienced and small judiciary, which also increases 
certainty; (c) the large number of corporations currently domiciled in Delaware, 
3
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Delaware’s corporate monopoly7 by enacting business courts ostensibly 
modeled after the Court of Chancery.8  In turn, some commentators suggest 
that states that fail to enact a business court may lose jobs and businesses to 
those states that do have business courts.9 
 
which increases the rate at which precedents are made and increases the relative 
economic importance of franchise tax revenue to the state; (d) a two-thirds 
supermajority vote requirement in the General Assembly for amendments to the 
Delaware General Corporation Law making it difficult to reverse the presently 
favorable corporate code; and (e) high levels of investment in transaction specific 
assets such as a highly developed statutory law and common law and the expertise 
of its corporate attorneys. 
Id. (first citing Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 
CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987); then citing Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces 
of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 241, 280 (1985)).  In the 2004 Final 
Report and Recommendation created by the North Carolina Chief Justice’s Commission on 
the future of the North Carolina Business Court, the Commission specifically mentioned 
that the North Carolina Commission and Bureau for Laws and the Economy (NCCBLE), the 
organization tasked with making business-law recommendations, cited Delaware’s Court of 
Chancery, and stated the following: 
The NCCBLE noted the high esteem in which the Delaware Chancery Court is 
held by the national business community.  While many states, including North 
Carolina, had amended their business laws to be more consistent with the Model 
Corporation Act, none had taken steps to make its court system as responsive and 
predictable as the Delaware Chancery Court in dealing with complex corporate 
issues. 
CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF THE N.C. BUS. COURT, FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATION (2004), http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/ref/Final%20Commission%20 
Report.htm. 
 7. See generally Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a 
Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 938–45 (2012) (noting that the State of 
Nevada has redrafted its corporate laws, eliminating almost all corporate director liability, 
the effect of which is to try to attract corporate charters away from Delaware). 
 8. The concept of specialized business courts began during the late 1980s.  See Lee 
Applebaum, The Steady Growth of Business Courts, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 
70, 70 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2011), http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/ 
future-trends-2011/home/SpecializedCourtsServices/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20 
Trends/Author%20PDFs/Applebaum.ashx.  North Carolina and New York became two of 
the first states to actually open the doors.  Id. at 71.  Today, twenty-three states allow 
complex business and commercial disputes to be heard by special business courts.  Id. at 73.  
The twenty-third state to allow business courts is West Virginia, which established its 
business court in 2012.  See Christopher C. Wilkes, West Virginia’s New Business Court 
Division: An Overview of the Development and Operation of Trial Court Rule 29, W. VA. 
JUDICIARY, http://www.courtswv.gov/lower-courts/business-court-division/overview.html 
(last visited May 5, 2015). 
 9. Kimberly A. Ward, Getting Down to Business—Pennsylvania Must Create a 
Business Court, or Face the Consequences, 18 J.L. & COM. 415, 415–17 (1999) (advocating 
4
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A number of legal scholars, however, doubt whether these nascent 
business courts can compete against Delaware, even questioning whether 
the states are fighting over businesses and corporations.10  They argue that 
the Chancery Court is too established, reputable, and effective for an 
upstart business court to attract corporations away from Delaware.11  They 
also insist that business courts offer few advantages that corporations 
actually desire.12  Moreover, even if a business court could replicate the 
 
that “[s]tates, in their struggle to compete against one another to attract jobs and business, 
continually search for that which will provide even the slightest competitive edge,” and 
concluding that Pennsylvania must enact a business court or risk losing business and jobs). 
 10. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 555 (2002) 
(“The alleged vigorous race among states vying for incorporations, we argue, simply does 
not exist.”); Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1559, 1562 (2002).  Daines’s central finding states: 
[T]here is little evidence of a nationwide market in legal rules.  In spite of all the 
debate about firms’ freedom to incorporate anywhere, the importance of corporate 
law, and spirited state competition for charters, firms’ actual choices are much 
more mundane: 97% of public firms incorporate in either their home state or 
Delaware. 
Id. (emphasis in original); see also John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate 
Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1919–20 (2012) (casting doubt on whether 
business courts could ever produce tangible state benefits).  It has also been asserted that 
Delaware’s main rival for corporate work is not other states, but instead, the federal 
government and its courts.  See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 588, 597–98 (2003).  Roe notes: 
While academics have occasionally noted the potential for a federal impact on 
state corporate law, the usual perspective is that this impact is interstitial, weak, 
temporary, and exceptional.  After the federal government’s isolated impact on 
this or that issue, the corporate world will get back to normal.  I argue here, 
however, that the potential and actual impact of federal lawmaking on state 
corporate law, by setting boundaries, even broad ones, has been pervasive.  
Throughout the twentieth century, if the issue was important, it usually attracted 
Washington’s attention. 
Id. 
 11. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 725–26.  Kahan and Kamar note the 
economic barriers to entry for states seeking to compete against Delaware.  Delaware’s 
reputation is expansive.  Even if a state carbon copies Delaware, it will likely lack the 
esteem of the Court of Chancery and will be unable to replicate Delaware’s adjudicative 
quality.  Id. 
 12. Coyle, supra note 10, at 1955.  Coyle cites Kahan and Kamar’s analysis and 
explains that “business courts created over the past decade, like those that came before 
them, are typically assigned to hear cases covering the entire panoply of business law and do 
not focus solely on corporate law.”  Id. (citing Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 711 tbl.4).  
For this reason, Coyle argues that the business courts were not created to compete with 
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Court of Chancery’s inner mechanics, most companies care more about 
non-judicial factors, including tax rates and regulatory schemes, than they 
care about a state’s legal landscape, when making business and 
incorporation decisions.13  In short, while leaders and officials in North 
Carolina expect the Business Court to produce tangible state benefits, most 
legal scholars reject this contention. 
The purpose of this Article is to align expectations with reality.  The 
North Carolina Business Court may improve the state’s business climate, 
but not necessarily in all of the ways that its proponents originally 
expected.  The most important point of clarification is that the North 
Carolina Business Court—and most other business courts—has a different 
design from the Chancery Court.  The architects of each state’s business 
courts sought contrasting objectives, vested the courts with asymmetrical 
jurisdictional mandates, and provided each court with distinct tools to 
resolve a dispute.14  This Article creates a clearer picture of which 
characteristics distinguish the North Carolina Business Court from the 
Court of Chancery, explaining why the two forums should rarely compete 
over the same goods.  That said, improving upon and specializing North 
Carolina’s legal landscape might still bear fruit. 
Part I explains in greater detail the functions, powers, and jurisdictions 
of the North Carolina Business Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
emphasizing the ways in which the courts compare and diverge.  Part II 
traces many of the ways in which the Business Court could benefit North 
 
Delaware, but simply to “streamline commercial litigation.”  Id. (citing Kahan & Kamar, 
supra note 4, at 715). 
 13. See id. at 1940–41 (explaining that firms are more likely to be concerned about tax 
incentives, for instance, and only slightly care about the quality of the state’s courts).  Coyle 
states: 
[M]ost studies suggest that business expansion decisions are driven largely by 
economic factors rather than by legal or regulatory factors.  Specifically, these 
studies show that when businesses are expanding, they focus on issues such as 
market size, product demand, distribution channels, infrastructure quality, 
customer needs, the availability of capital, and the presence or absence of 
competitors, among others. 
Id. (citations omitted); cf. David M. Wilson, Note, Climate Change: The Real Threat to 
Delaware Corporate Law, Why Delaware Must Keep a Watchful Eye on the Content of 
Political Change in the Air, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 481, 481–82 (2010) (suggesting 
that political developments are more likely to influence incorporation decisions than 
judiciary developments). 
 14. See Coyle, supra note 10, at 1955 (indicating that most business courts are designed 
to handle a broad range of commercial litigation and are not designed to cater to the 
litigation needs of corporations specifically). 
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Carolina and the reasons why most scholars are less hopeful.15  Part III 
explores how North Carolina has faired with the Business Court and the 
possibility of creating local benefits, improving business jurisprudence, and 
usurping business opportunities from Delaware.  The Article concludes 
with critiques and recommendations. 
I. DEFINING AND COMPARING THE NORTH CAROLINA BUSINESS COURT 
AND THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY 
The North Carolina General Assembly established the Business Court 
to improve the state’s business and corporate atmosphere.16  Since many 
commentators assumed that the Business Court would function similarly to 
the Court of Chancery—or produce similar results17—this Part details both 
the Business Court and the Court of Chancery, comparing their essential 
features.  This Article offers a framework that explains why the Business 
Court should benefit North Carolina’s business environment, but perhaps 
not to the magnitude that its advocates had hoped. 
A. The Delaware Court of Chancery 
When Delaware first sought to attract outside corporations, its main 
tool was the state’s legislative branch, thinking little of the Chancery 
Court’s potential role.18  The Delaware General Assembly first drafted and 
 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 1940–41 (noting the reasons why business courts are, for instance, 
unlikely to attract out-of-state businesses).  But see Andrew A. Powell, It’s Nothing 
Personal, It’s Just Business: A Commentary on the South Carolina Business Court Pilot 
Program, 61 S.C. L. REV. 823, 828–30 (2010) (citing Nees, supra note 3, at 482) (noting 
that the North Carolina Business Court has been considered a success). 
 16. See Exec. Order No. 44, North Carolina Commission on Business Laws and the 
Economy, 9 N.C. Reg. 227 (May 16, 1994) (establishing a commission to make 
recommendations to the legislature that will improve the business climate in North 
Carolina); see also O’Brien, supra note 1, at 367 (providing sources from North Carolina 
suggesting that a business court would provide significant local benefits); About the Court, 
supra note 1. 
 17. See Jones, supra note 2, at 195–96 (noting that North Carolina established the North 
Carolina Commission on Business Laws and the Economy in 1994, which sought to use the 
Chancery Court as a model for the new North Carolina Business Court (first citing Exec. 
Order No. 44, supra note 16; then citing Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Courts, Business Courts: 
Towards a More Efficient Judiciary, 52 BUS. LAW. 947, 955–56, 961 (1997))). 
 18. Donald F. Parsons Jr. & Joseph R. Slights III, The History of Delaware’s Business 
Courts, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 21, 22–23 (explaining that Delaware’s first 
attempts to attract corporate charters from New Jersey was by the enactment of a new 
corporate code, resembling New Jersey’s corporate code). 
7
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amended the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) in 1899, 
designing it to compete against New Jersey, which at that time was in 
possession of more corporate charters than any other state.19  Then, after 
Delaware copied New Jersey’s corporate code, New Jersey Governor 
Woodrow Wilson—who was laboring under local political conditions—
scaled back many of the state’s corporate protections, effectively helping 
Delaware to become the nation’s new favored corporate home.20 
Also contrary to popular belief, Delaware’s leadership did not 
originally intend the Court of Chancery to serve as the state’s exclusive 
forum for corporate disputes.21  Instead, Delaware created the Chancery 
Court in 1792 to serve as a court of equity, granting it the same equitable 
jurisdiction that existed in England before the American Revolution.22  The 
key distinction between courts of law and those of equity is that courts of 
law favor legal remedies (i.e., monetary damages), whereas courts of equity 
fashion remedies, such as specific performance and injunctive relief, when 
 
 19. See Delaware General Corporation Law of 1899, ch. 273, 21 Del. Laws 445 
(codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101–619 (2013)); see also Parsons & 
Slights, supra note 18, at 22.  According to Parsons and Slights: 
In 1897, Delaware adopted a new constitution, permitting incorporation under 
general law instead of by special legislative mandate.  Under this provision, 
Delaware enacted a general corporation law in 1899 calling for perpetual 
corporate existence and general powers.  Before then, most of the country’s large 
corporations incorporated in New Jersey.  In fact, Delaware modeled its 1899 
General Corporation Law largely after the relatively liberal statute New Jersey 
had at that time. 
Id. 
 20. Robert C. Holmes, Benefits of Incorporating in Delaware Versus New Jersey: 
Busting the Myth and Closing the Gap, 11 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 3, 11 (2014) (mentioning 
how Delaware copied New Jersey’s corporate statute to attract charters, but was not 
successful until Woodrow Wilson’s administration passed certain state-level legislation, 
driving its corporations to Delaware); Parsons & Slights, supra note 18, at 22 (explaining 
that corporations fled New Jersey after the state passed laws decreasing competition and 
mitigating antitrust concerns); Wilson, supra note 13, at 482–84 (remarking that Woodrow 
Wilson’s attempt to dismantle New Jersey corporate law was in an attempt to placate 
national audiences in hopes of successfully campaigning for the presidency). 
 21. See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 3, at 825–31 (reciting the anomalous historical 
factors that led to the Chancery Court’s creation).  While it seems that the Chancery Court’s 
creation was due, at least in part, to the growth of industry, little evidence suggests that 
corporate law was at the forefront of the decision.  See id. 
 22. Id. at 849 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . determined that the Court of Chancery 
constitutionally possesses the general equity powers of the High Court of Chancery in Great 
Britain as they existed at the time of the 1776 separation.”). 
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monetary damages are inadequate or fail to make the claimant whole.23  In 
fact, only a few other courts of equity existed at that time,24 since the trend 
in the late eighteenth century was to eliminate courts of equity in favor of 
general courts of law with equitable capabilities.25 
Today, the Court of Chancery remains a court of equity, applying a 
two-part test to determine whether a dispute’s subject matter is appropriate 
 
 23. See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. 
L. REV. 429, 442, 451 (2003) (explaining that equitable jurisdiction is satisfied when courts 
of law cannot provide “plain, adequate and complete” relief).  Typical equitable disputes 
involve remedies such as the specific performance of a contract, a temporary injunction 
against irreparable harm, or an action to remedy an alleged breach of fiduciary duties.  Id. at 
477–78; see also Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 3, at 864.  Equitable jurisdiction also 
favors cases involving “unique” subject matter, like a painting or real property, considering 
that legal remedies typically provide only a poor replacement.  See, e.g., Kozar v. Christie’s, 
Inc., No. 30029/10, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2350, at *18–19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (“Items 
that have been found to be unique are heirlooms, works of art, patents and inventions, and 
particular shares of stock with peculiar investment features.” (first citing Staff v. 
Hemingway, 1975 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); then citing Morse v. 
Penzimer, 1968 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1163 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968))); see also Carl F. Zick, Note, 
Equity—Specific Performance of Contracts, 16 MARQUETTE L. REV. 276, 276–77 (1932) 
(noting that equitable remedies, including specific performance, are appropriate when legal 
remedies are inadequate).  Stock, for instance, is considered a “unique” good and is thus 
appropriate for equitable jurisdiction, because a legal remedy can only compensate its owner 
for the market value of the stock at the time its owner was deprived of it.  See, e.g., Hoge v. 
Pollard, 188 S.E. 867, 869 (W. Va. 1936) (noting that because of the unique value of stock, 
“a court of equity will take jurisdiction to administer specific performance or kindred relief).  
The owner is thus deprived of any expected benefits from future appreciation or any 
corporate ownership benefits attendant to the stock.  Rochelle Dreyfuss finds that: 
These cases appear on Chancery’s docket, however, not because the Delaware 
Legislature carved out this jurisdiction, but because these cases generally raise the 
kinds of questions with which equity deals: the duty of disclosure, the duty of 
good faith, and the like.  Moreover, corporate cases often involve demands for the 
kind of relief—accountings, appointments of receivers, and orders to transfer 
corporate shares—that were traditionally available only at equity.  Finally, 
because Delaware procedure treats class actions and shareholder derivative 
actions as equitable in nature, Chancery Court hears all corporate cases structured 
along those lines. 
Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 7. 
 24. The only states that currently employ equitable courts are Delaware, Mississippi, 
and Tennessee.  See Kate Margolis, A Brief History of Mississippi’s Chancery Court, CAP. 
AREA B. ASS’N (May 2012), http://www.caba.ms/articles/features/history-mississippi- 
chancery.html. 
 25. See Main, supra note 23, at 431 (“In the middle of the nineteenth century, 
procedural codes merged law and equity into a single unified system in most American state 
courts.”). 
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for equitable jurisdiction.26  The first prong assesses whether the plaintiff 
has asked for an equitable remedy based upon an equitable right, and the 
second prong looks at whether an adequate legal remedy exists.27  A legal 
remedy bars equitable jurisdiction if it is “full, fair and complete,” 
“available as a matter of right,” and able to provide as full and sufficient 
relief as equity.28  Under the “clean-up doctrine,” the Chancery Court may 
issue a legal remedy if the dispute’s primary basis lies in equity.29 
For much of the Chancery Court’s early tenure, the court was not 
viewed as a forum that specialized in corporate disputes.30  However, 
during the 1980s, the number of hostile corporate takeovers sharply 
increased, and corporate managers realized the Court of Chancery’s ability 
to efficiently resolve corporate disputes.31  This is because most corporate 
conflicts involve subject matter that implicates an equitable remedy without 
an adequate legal resolution.32  For instance, equity is typically available to 
remedy breaches of fiduciary duties or to settle matters of corporate 
control.33  The property at issue in most corporate disputes is also typically 
 
 26. See Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 402 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Generally, equity 
jurisdiction arise[s] from two sets of circumstances.  The first involves a request for an 
equitable remedy: injunction, constructive trust, specific restitution, etc.  The second rests 
on the assertion of an equitable right: the right to hold a trustee to account, fiduciary duties 
generally etc.” (emphasis in original)). 
 27. See id.   
 28. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., C.A. No. 18167, 2001 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 31, at *9–10 (Del. Ch. 2001) (quoting Clark v. Teeven Holding Co., 625 A.2d 
869, 881 (Del. Ch. 1992)). 
 29. See Medek v. Medek, C.A. No. 2559-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132, at *13–14 
(Del. Ch. 2008) (quoting Prestancia Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Va. Heritage Found., II LLC, No. 
1032-S, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 80, at *11 (Del. Ch. 2005)); see also Bird, 681 A.2d at 402 
(“The fact that a complaint seeks only the award of a money judgment does not mean, 
however, that a legal remedy is adequate and this Court is therefore without jurisdiction.”). 
 30. See Parsons & Slights, supra note 18, at 21–22. 
 31. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 3, at 863.  Quillen and Hanrahan observe: 
As takeover fever continued to mount and the array of takeover techniques and 
defenses continued to expand, the Court was called upon to arbitrate marathon 
takeover battles with multiple expedited applications for equitable relief. . . . The 
fever finally broke in the early 1990s.  However, the Court’s body of opinions 
deciding, usually within a few days, complex legal issues arising from extremely 
complicated transactions stands as a remarkable judicial achievement.  Under 
intense scrutiny, the Court proved it was up to the task of deciding quickly and 
coherently whatever corporate America and its advisors could concoct. 
Id. 
 32. Nees, supra note 3, at 480–81 (quoting Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 7). 
 33. See Frederick P. Santarelli, Note, Preliminary Injunctions in Delaware: The Need 
for a Clearer Standard, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 107, 108–09 n.4 (1988) (explaining that certain 
10
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unique, such as stock, which allows shareholders to use the Chancery Court 
to challenge acts that affect their corporate ownership.34 
The nature of equitable jurisdiction alone is probably not the reason 
that a majority of large American companies have chosen to incorporate in 
Delaware.  A more salient factor is likely that the business and legal 
communities hold the Chancery Court and its chancellors in the highest 
regard.35  Indeed, the Chancery Court writes and publishes opinions after 
almost every case, creating a lengthy and reliable body of case law.36  
Delaware has also sought to remove political stigma from the court by 
appointing chancellors to serve eight-year terms, whereas most state judges 
compete in judicial elections for shorter terms.37   
The Delaware General Assembly also allocates significant resources 
to the chancellors to hire law clerks, and considering the nature of the 
court’s work, Chancery Court clerkships have become some of the most 
prestigious and competitive clerkships in the country.38  The end result is a 
court that possesses substantial power to remedy corporate disputes, 
manned by highly respected jurists with the resources and capabilities to 
 
equitable remedies offered by courts of equity, such as the preliminary injunction, are 
typically attractive remedies for corporate law disputes (quoting Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty 
Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REV. 171, 190–91 (1936))). 
 34. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 3, at 832–34; see supra note 23. 
 35. See Coyle, supra note 10, at 1951–52 (“Delaware’s success in attracting corporate 
charters is frequently attributed to the fact that its Court of Chancery generates and draws 
upon a vast body of published case law, is staffed by judges with considerable expertise in 
corporate law, and has a reputation for expeditious resolution of cases.”). 
 36. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 725–26 (noting the depth of Delaware’s 
corporate case law). 
 37. See Wilson, supra note 13, at 486. Wilson states: 
The Chancery is appointed in a non-political process, rather than being elected.  
This process is further checked by a requirement of bi-partisan representation 
amongst the judges, thus ensuring chancellors are beholden only to the law and its 
efficient execution; they have no interest in possessing a bully pulpit to espouse 
their beliefs to the citizens of Delaware. 
Id. (citing DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3). 
 38. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 713–14 n.115 (comparing the lack of funding 
at the inception of the North Carolina Business Court to the funding and availability of 
clerks at the Delaware Court of Chancery); see also J.W. Verret, Clerkships in Delaware for 
Aspiring Corporate Lawyers, TRUTH ON MKT. (Apr. 12, 2010), http://truthonthemarket.com/ 
2010/04/12/clerkships-in-delaware-for-aspiring-corporate-lawyers/ (observing that for 
aspiring corporate lawyers, a clerkship in the Delaware Court of Chancery “is far more 
valuable than one in a federal appellate court, or even . . . the U.S. Supreme Court”). 
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establish a formidable history of corporate law.39  In fact, other states hold 
Delaware corporate opinions in such high regard that many have sought to 
improve or develop their own bodies of corporate law by incorporating 
Delaware case law into their own court opinions.40 
B. The North Carolina Business Court 
Since its establishment in 1996, the North Carolina Business Court 
has assumed a primary role in the adjudication of business disputes in 
North Carolina.  As the current chief judge of the court has stated, the 
Business Court “is not simply a pro-business court.  It is a court for 
sophisticated business cases, creating a sophisticated environment for both 
businesses and those having disputes with businesses.”41 
The Business Court currently sits in the state’s three largest cities—
Greensboro, Charlotte, and Raleigh42—and the court’s presence in the state 
is expected to expand this year, with the addition of a fourth judge.43  Some 
of the court’s early advantages included being staffed by judges with expert 
knowledge of commercial law, reassuring companies that disputes would 
be resolved in an efficient and sophisticated manner.44  Business Court 
 
 39. See Coyle, supra note 10, at 1951–52 (finding that corporations are most likely to 
be chartered in Delaware because the “Court of Chancery generates and draws upon a vast 
body of published case law, is staffed by judges with considerable expertise in corporate 
law, and has a reputation for expeditious resolution of cases” (citing Randy J. Holland, 
Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J. CORP. L. 771, 776–79 (2009))). 
 40. See, e.g., State v. Custard, No. 06 CVS 4622, 2010 NCBC LEXIS 9, at *65–69 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2010) (referring to and then adopting Delaware’s rule of the duty 
to monitor, established in Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)). 
 41. Bob Friedman, Judicial Profile, North Carolina Business Court, 2 ATT’Y L. MAG. 
(N.C. Triangle ed.), no. 7, 2014, at 12, 12, http://www.attorneyatlawmagazine.com/triangle- 
edition/judicial-profile-north-carolina-business-court/ (quoting Chief Judge James Gale of 
the North Carolina Business Court). 
 42. See N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, NORTH CAROLINA BUSINESS COURT: 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2011), http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2011%20Annual%20 
Report%20with%20Cover.pdf. 
 43. See Friedman, supra note 41; Matt Leerberg, Mike Robinson Nominated to Become 
Fourth Business Court Judge, N.C. APP. PRAC. BLOG (Mar. 25, 2015), 
http://www.ncapb.com/2015/03/25/mike-robinson-nominated-to-become-fourth-business-
court-judge/ (announcing the governor’s nomination of a fourth business court judge, but 
noting that the site of the fourth judge’s court is still unknown); see also id. (noting that, 
according to several sources, “there is a desire to provide closer access to the business court 
for parties and attorneys in the far west and far east of the state”). 
 44. See O’Brien, supra note 1, at 370 (suggesting that judges with specialized 
knowledge are more likely to issue “timely” decisions); see also CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMM’N 
ON THE FUTURE OF THE N.C. BUS. COURT, supra note 6 (noting that the NCCBLE originally 
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judges are selected based on their business and corporate expertise, and 
subsequent experiences on the court’s bench likewise promote an even 
greater knowledge of local business jurisprudence.45  Similar to the Court 
of Chancery, each Business Court judge was initially appointed by the 
governor in an effort to depoliticize the court.46  Each judge presides over 
the entire life span of a lawsuit, promoting greater continuity throughout 
litigation.47 
Importantly, the Court of Chancery and the Business Court differ in 
the types of disputes that they hear and the manner in which each case is 
resolved.  Whereas the Court of Chancery hears only equitable cases 
without a jury, the Business Court allows attorneys to request a jury trial 
for both equitable and nonequitable disputes, including contract conflicts 
and other cases where the plaintiff seeks a legal remedy.48 
For the Business Court to have jurisdiction over a case, the initial 
design was to streamline cases through a bimodal system.  First, there is an 
original class of disputes that automatically implicated the Business Court’s 
 
recommended that at least one expert in corporate law be appointed to the Business Court 
and touting the efficiency of jurists with expertise in corporate-law matters). 
 45. Jones, supra note 2, at 208.  Jones explains: 
The selection of “expert[s] in corporate law matters” and other highly qualified 
legal practitioners to serve as Business Court judges provides the Business Court 
with a strong foundation of knowledge.  Further, as these judges “consistently 
hear particular types of cases, they develop expertise, experience, and knowledge 
enabling them to perform their functions more proficiently than they could 
without that expertise.  They are more efficient, and the quality of their decisions 
is better.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (first quoting COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 9; then 
quoting Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Cts., supra note 17, at 951). 
 46. See id. at 199 (noting that North Carolina’s governor appoints special superior court 
judges, and the chief justice of the state supreme court designates them as business court 
judges (first citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-45.1, .3 (2013); then citing N.C. BUS. CT. R. 
2.2)).  But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.1(a10) (amended 2014) (requiring General 
Assembly confirmation for all Business Court judgeships that begin on or after September 1, 
2014).  Under the new procedure in section 7A-45.1(a10), current Business Court judges 
must be confirmed by the General Assembly each time their five-year term expires.  See id. 
 47. Memorandum from I. Beverly Lake, Jr., former Chief Justice of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court, to all Superior Court Judges, Guidelines for Assignment of Cases to the 
N.C. Bus. Court 1 (Mar. 7, 2001), http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/OtherRefdocs/Guidelines 
%20for%20NCBC%20Assignment.pdf. 
 48. See Coyle, supra note 10, at 1953–54 (explaining that the type of jurisdiction of 
business courts differs substantially from the Court of Chancery (citing Kahan & Kamar, 
supra note 4, at 711 tbl.4)). 
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jurisdiction, including securities law, tax law, corporations, and antitrust.49  
The General Assembly recently expanded the categories of cases that 
receive mandatory jurisdiction.50  That expansion added disputes pertaining 
to certain tax issues and corporate disputes over $5 million.51  Otherwise, a 
plaintiff must initiate a case in accordance with North Carolina’s ordinary 
rules of procedure and contemporaneously file a notice of designation with 
the complaint that seeks removal to the Business Court.52  If a plaintiff fails 
to make such a filing, the defendant may request within thirty days that the 
superior court remove the case to the Business Court, at which point the 
chief justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court decides whether to 
remove the dispute to the Business Court.53  Removal requests are usually 
granted if the case embodies a “substantial” or “complex business” subject 
matter.54  Although the enumerated dispute categories were contemplated 
by and included in the Business Court’s operative statute,55 the North 
Carolina legislature intentionally left the term “complex” undefined.56  
Former North Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Lake issued a 
memorandum that sought to add clarity, noting that the Business Court 
should hear so-called Meiselman57 disputes regarding shareholders’ rights 
in closely held corporations, partnership disputes, and other types of 
corporate conflicts.58 
Although the Business Court started slowly, its usage and reputation 
has grown to the degree that leadership in North Carolina, including the 
General Assembly and the chief justice of the state supreme court, has 
 
 49. CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF THE N.C. BUS. COURT, supra note 6. 
 50. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4 (amended 2014). 
 51. See id. §§ 7A-45.4(b)(1), (2). 
 52. Order on Notice of Designation at 1–3, Foster v. Bell Mini-Storage, Inc., No. 12 
CVS 3084 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2012) (describing the procedure for removing a case to 
the business court).  For a guide to the North Carolina Business Court’s rules, see N.C. 
Business Court Frequently Asked Questions, N.C. BUS. CT., http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net 
/FAQ/business_court_frequently_asked.htm (last visited May 4, 2015). 
 53. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-45.4(d), (f). 
 54. See, e.g., Order on Notice of Designation, supra note 52; see also N.C. Business 
Court Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 52. 
 55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4. 
 56. See Press Millen, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, Why Do We Have a 
Business Court?, at VI-B-7 to -8 (May 4, 2007), http://www.wcsr.com/resources/pdfs/ 
bl051208.pdf. 
 57. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983) (involving a breach of 
fiduciary duty and a request for the forced dissolution of a close corporation). 
 58. Memorandum from I. Beverly Lake, Jr., supra note 47, at 2; see also Millen, supra 
note 56, at VI-B-8. 
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss2/2
2015] REVISITING THE NORTH CAROLINA BUSINESS COURT 291 

sought to expand the court’s prominence.59  After all, the Business Court 
initially published only a handful of opinions, releasing five written 
opinions in 1997, four in 1998, and less than a dozen in 2005.60  That 
number increased to fifty-five cases in 2013,61 which prompted legislation 
to increase the state’s reliance on the Business Court.  For instance, 
litigants may now fast-track more cases directly to the Business Court, 
eliminating much of the cost and wasted time associated with complex 
business litigation.62  Appeals were previously directed to the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals, but now, litigants can bypass that court and 
appeal directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.63  In fact, a fourth 
judge will soon be added to help compensate for the court’s booming 
workload.64  Considering that these actions will likely increase the Business 
Court’s efficiency, parties may become even more likely to choose the 
Business Court as the favored forum for business disputes. 
However, an issue remains concerning the value of Business Court 
opinions: they lack precedential value.65  Some courts may be persuaded to 
 
 59. See Mark Martin’s Seven-Point Plan, in Russell Rawlings, Chief Justice Mark 
Martin Takes Charge, N.C. LAW., Feb. 2015, at 7, 8, http://www.ncbar.org/media/440272/ 
nc-lawyer-february-2015.pdf (listing North Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Mark 
Martin’s seven-point plan to strengthen the state’s justice system, which includes renewing 
“the Chief Justice’s Commission on the Business Court with a view toward expanding the 
business court”); see also Laura DeVivo, Business Court Modernization Bill Is Now North 
Carolina Law, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ 
business-court-modernization-bill-now-north-carolina-law (explaining how the modernization 
bill affects the Business Court). 
 60. See Court Opinions, N.C. BUS. CT., http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/New/opinions/ 
(last visited May 4, 2015). 
 61. Id.; N.C. BUS. COURT, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 16–22 (2013), http://www.ncbusiness 
court.net/opinions/Final.pdf. 
 62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (2013) (providing that appellate-review power lies in the 
supreme court for “any final judgment in a case designated as a mandatory complex 
business case pursuant to [N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4] or designated as a discretionary 
complex business case”). 
 63. Id.; see also Matt Leerberg, Law Expands Supreme Court Jurisdiction to Include 
Direct Appeals in Business Court Cases and from Orders Invalidating Acts of the General 
Assembly, N.C. APP. PRAC. BLOG (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.ncapb.com/2014/08/08/law-
expands-supreme-court-jurisdiction-to-include-direct-appeals-in-business-court-cases-and-
from-orders-invalidating-acts-of-the-general-assembly/ (explaining this change). 
 64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.1(a9) (amended 2014); see supra note 43 and 
accompanying text. 
 65. Estate of Browne v. Thompson, 727 S.E.2d 573, 576 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“The 
Business Court is a special Superior Court, the decisions of which have no precedential 
value in North Carolina.”); see Jones, supra note 2, at 206–07 (noting that while Business 
Court decisions are not binding on any other court, they should be granted persuasive 
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adopt the court’s rulings, though other courts will likely choose to ignore 
them.66  In fact, this has created discord among varying levels of the North 
Carolina judiciary.67  This uncertainty has led a few North Carolina Court 
of Appeals decisions to explicitly announce that they would not be bound 
by Business Court decisions.68 
In sum, direct appeals from the Business Court to the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina could potentially help to strengthen the weight of 
Business Court opinions.69  Even as “non-precedential,” the Business 
Court’s decisions are highly instructive and persuasive in helping to 
develop a business-law tradition and in establishing a thorough body of 
case law from its increasingly high volume of written opinions on complex 
business matters.  
Part II explores how the North Carolina Business Court might (or 
might not) benefit the state in ways similar to which the Court of Chancery 
benefits the State of Delaware. 
II. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA  
BUSINESS COURT 
In light of both the Business Court’s and the Chancery Court’s inner 
mechanics, it appears that the Business Court could boost North Carolina 
business and commerce, though probably not in a manner that competes 
with Delaware.  This is because, as previously stated, the Business Court 
and Chancery Court are disparate forums, formed under different, salient 
conditions. 
For instance, the Chancery Court hears only equitable disputes and 
issues equitable remedies.  The Chancery Court has a history of effectively 
resolving certain disputes, while the Business Court is still in its infancy.  
That said, the benefits that some observers expect the North Carolina 
Business Court to produce span a diverse range.  For instance, some of the 
effects may be felt exclusively on the state level by improving local 
 
authority, like opinions from the Delaware Court of Chancery); CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMM’N ON 
THE FUTURE OF THE N.C. BUS. COURT, supra note 6. 
 66. Jones, supra note 2, at 205–06 (asserting that while some confusion might exist 
over whether Business Court decisions definitively lack precedential value, courts have at 
least cited these opinions as persuasive sources, while acknowledging their lack of binding 
precedence). 
 67. Id. (discussing the North Carolina Court of Appeals’ treatment of Business Court 
decisions). 
 68. See, e.g., Estate of Browne, 727 S.E.2d at 576. 
 69. See Leerberg, supra note 63.  
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adjudication of business disputes.  Other predictions, though, concern 
whether the Business Court could help North Carolina compete against 
other states.  This latter category includes retaining local businesses, 
attracting out-of-state companies, encouraging foreign firms to incorporate 
in North Carolina, and increasing the rate of local litigation.  The Sections 
below address each theory in greater detail. 
A. Improving Business Jurisprudence 
At its core, advocates of the Business Court say that the court will 
increase judicial consistency and improve the sophistication and skill of the 
dispute-resolution process.70  For example, one study found that business 
courts are likely to improve core qualities of the legal process, including 
“access to judicial resources,” “timely action,” “ruling and operating with 
equality and integrity,” “maintaining judicial independence,” and “instilling 
public trust and confidence in the judicial branch.”71  States and their 
business courts improve these core qualities by “tracking like cases to one 
judge or judges,” “dedicating judicial resources to a business court,” 
“ensuring that a business court bench is staffed with experienced judges 
with expertise in the substantive area of law,” and “selecting business court 
judges outside of corporate influences.”72 
While the factors listed above focus largely on the quality and process 
of jurisprudence, the Business Court could also bolster the state’s local 
business climate by improving judicial economy.  A significant aspect of 
business is the cost associated with trying a claim.73  By streamlining and 
 
 70. Ertel Berry, More Judges Needed to Keep Pace With Increased Caseload, N.C. 
LAW. WKLY., Jan. 17, 2005, at 1, 3 (noting that the Business Court has been an “unqualified 
success” due to “improved case management; increased speed and flexibility in handling 
complex business issues; cutting-edge courtroom technology; the benefits of specialization; 
predictability and uniformity afforded by posting all opinions; and attracting business to the 
state” (quoting CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF THE N.C. BUS. COURT, supra 
note 6)); see also More About North Carolina’s Business Court, W. VA. REC. (Nov. 15, 
2010, 8:00 AM), http://wvrecord.com/news/231260-more-about-north-carolinas-business-
court (discussing the advantages of the North Carolina Business Court to the state in 
debating whether West Virginia should consider enacting its own business court).  See 
generally Nees, supra note 3. 
 71. Nees, supra note 3, at 482–83. 
 72. Id. at 483. 
 73. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.11, at 781 (8th ed. 
2011) (explaining that the costs of litigation may even encourage resourceful companies to 
artificially spend more on litigation in hopes of spending to the point where their opponent 
cannot continue); Robert Bovarnick, When Is Litigation Worth the Hassle?, FORBES (July 
21, 2010, 6:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/21/when-to-sue-entrepreneurs-law- 
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simplifying the process, the Business Court allows litigants to not only 
receive high-quality jurisprudence, but to do so at a cheaper cost.74 
Other qualities of the Business Court similarly improve judicial 
economy.  For instance, the Business Court has been given advanced 
technology to resolve commercial and corporate disputes more timely and 
efficiently.75  The court’s use of enhanced technology has served as a 
model for other states—especially for its use of electronic filing and case-
management systems.76  This is just one way that the court has helped to 
improve judicial economy and expedite efficiency in business disputes. 
The Business Court can also help keep litigants out of court, further 
reducing the costs of business.  This is because the Business Court issues 
around sixty opinions per year, which are focused on some business 
aspect.77  With an increased depth of North Carolina case law, conflicting 
parties should be more likely to settle claims out of court instead of paying 
the added costs of litigation.  Indeed, parties that have less information 
about how a court will rule are more apt to litigate than parties who can 
rely upon rich case law to determine whether the costs of litigation seem 
worthwhile.78  By improving the quantity and quality of available case law, 
 
taxation-bovarnick.html (outlining how the costs inherent to litigation often influence how 
to negotiate strategies and even whether to go to trial).  High litigation costs can undermine 
the benefits of a meritorious claim.  But cf. id. 
 74. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-27(a)(2)–(3) (amended 2014) (directing appeals from 
the Business Court to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, bypassing the state court of 
appeals); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.  Litigants can now skip one 
appellate process, which inherently leads to a reduction in costs. 
 75. O’Brien, supra note 1, at 378–82 (mentioning that North Carolina’s use of 
technology distinguishes it from other business courts).  The technology is used in a range 
of areas: “[f]irst, the [court] created an electronic filing system, with the ultimate goal being 
a paperless courtroom. . . . The second goal of the technology project was to improve the 
technology inside the courtroom itself. . . . The final goal . . . was to create an online 
database for the court’s opinions.”  Id. 
 76. See Friedman, supra note 41, at 13.  
 77. Court Opinions, supra note 60.  This number is expected to increase as a result of 
the recent legislation, which requires Business Court judges to “issue a written opinion in 
connection with any order granting or denying a motion under [North Carolina Rules of 
Civil Procedure] Rule 12, 56, 59, or 60, or any order finally disposing of a complex business 
case, other than an order effecting a settlement agreement or jury verdict.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 7A-45.3.    
 78. See POSNER, supra note 73, § 20.1, at 743–44.  For instance, stare decisis is 
important because it entails the governing rules of case law.  The body of case law serves a 
utility by adding information to claimants about the likely merits of their case and, in turn, 
whether litigating makes economic sense.  Id. 
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the Business Court provides predictability, thus helping parties to reduce 
litigation costs by increasing the frequency of settlements.79 
B. Attracting Corporate Charters 
Another contention is that the Business Court will allow North 
Carolina to compete against other states for corporate charters,80 though 
most scholars refute this assertion.81  While corporations overwhelmingly 
select Delaware as their corporate home, it is errantly assumed that 
companies incorporate in Delaware solely because of the Chancery Court.82  
In reality, there are a number of other attractive factors unique to Delaware, 
including the strength of the DGCL and the state’s reputation as a long-
time steward of corporate jurisprudence.83  In turn, the choice of where to 
incorporate is typically bimodal in the sense that 97% of companies 
incorporate either in Delaware or in their home state, suggesting that 
business courts are unlikely to threaten Delaware’s corporate monopoly.84  
Perhaps more importantly, the value of attracting corporate charters is 
vastly misunderstood, considering that marginal increases should produce 
few meaningful benefits. 
As background, freedom of incorporation is made possible by the 
internal-affairs doctrine, which permits a company to incorporate in any 
 
 79. Id.; see also Friedman, supra note 41, at 13 (“The business court, which often 
issues thoughtful opinions on issues that have yet to be developed in the appellate courts, 
helps reduce the unknown.”). 
 80. See Millen, supra note 56, at VI-B-2 (noting that the architects of the Business 
Court sought to attract outside companies to incorporate in North Carolina); see also Kahan 
& Kamar, supra note 4, at 723–24 (discussing historic interstate competition for corporate 
charters). 
 81. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 724–25 (arguing that the depth and 
intricacy of Delaware case law is attractive to lawyers and corporations, which others states 
will struggle to recreate). 
 82. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1081 (2000) (asserting that Delaware offers a 
particularly attractive corporate landscape leading to corporate charters because of the 
unique inner-workings of the Chancery Court relative to the state’s legislature). 
 83. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 726 (“It is true that by emulating Delaware a 
competitor state would not deliver the same product that Delaware does.  Copying Delaware 
statutory law would not obviate the need for an expert court and, even with such a court, the 
competitor state would lack Delaware’s reputation.”). 
 84. Daines, supra note 10, at 1562 (“Firm choices are thus oddly ‘bimodal’—they 
operate as if there is no national market but a single choice: their home jurisdiction or 
Delaware.”). 
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state, despite a lack of contacts.85  This allows out-of-state corporations to 
avail themselves of another state’s laws while also becoming amenable to 
lawsuits in that state.86  Said differently, the primary good sold on the 
interstate corporate market is each state’s legal system.  While the 
predominant choice is functionally bimodal,87 according to other 
researchers, a meaningful number of companies elect to incorporate in 
some third state—that is, a state other than Delaware or their home state.88  
That said, some studies opine that Delaware’s corporate dominance is even 
greater than it was previously perceived to be.89 
Despite the historical preference for Delaware’s corporate law, 
proponents of the North Carolina Business Court assert that replicating 
Delaware’s judiciary could help North Carolina to become a competing 
corporate forum.90  This belief seems unlikely though, considering that 
other factors are more likely to influence incorporation decisions than a 
state’s judiciary.91  In particular, a state’s legislature is probably far more 
 
 85. See Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal 
Affairs, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 161, 161 (defining the internal-affairs 
doctrine). 
 86. See Wilson, supra note 13, at 482.  Wilson states: 
The [internal-affairs doctrine] prescribes that the law of the state of incorporation 
govern[s] a corporation’s internal affairs, primarily the decisions made by 
corporate leaders, and the fiduciary duties associated with those decisions.  
Historically, this doctrine has been followed both horizontally between states and 
vertically between individual states and the federal government. 
Id. 
 87. Daines, supra note 10, at 1562 (finding that “there is little evidence of a nationwide 
market in legal rules”).  Further, “[i]n spite of all the debate about firms’ freedom to 
incorporate anywhere, the importance of corporate law, and spirited state competition for 
charters, firms’ actual choices are much more mundane: 97% of public firms incorporate in 
their home state or Delaware.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 88. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 
46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 387 (2003). 
 89. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 10, at 555 (“We present evidence that 
Delaware’s dominant position is far stronger, and thus that the competitive threat that it 
faces is far weaker, than has been previously recognized.”). 
 90. See O’Brien, supra note 1, at 367–68 (recounting that local leaders in North 
Carolina believed that the Business Court would help the state to replicate Delaware’s 
corporate success). 
 91. Coyle, supra note 10, at 1940–41 (arguing that companies care more about 
“economic factors” than legal or regulatory factors, and that particular interests include a 
state’s “market size, product demand, distribution channels, infrastructure quality, customer 
needs, the availability of capital, and the presence or absence of competitors, among 
others”). 
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important.92  The Delaware General Assembly, for example, has proven 
particularly capable of quickly and efficiently creating and amending its 
corporate code in a manner that favors corporations.93  With the state’s 
history of corporate-friendly legislation94 and an expert judiciary to 
adjudicate its code,95 one study on initial public offerings found that 
incorporating in Delaware significantly increases a company’s value.96  
Replicating either Delaware’s case law or the quality of its judiciary would 
likely be so difficult that it would take generations before a state could 
possibly compete.97  Similarly, some research suggests that companies that 
are considering incorporating in a jurisdiction outside of either their home 
state or Delaware risk substantial agency costs, since a company’s lawyers 
and practitioners will often be most familiar with and competent to practice 
a more well-known body of law—and some lawyers may even have 
incentives to steer their clients to certain states.98 
 
 92. But see Fisch, supra note 82, at 1066 (suggesting that states probably do not 
incorporate in certain states for its corporate statutes because there is little significant 
variation between the various bodies of law). 
 93. See Wilson, supra note 13, at 485 (“The legislature does not micromanage the 
courts; rather it allows them to develop a stable body of law; however, if significant 
mistakes do occur in the creation of common law, the system is able to move swiftly to 
correct any uncertainty.”). 
 94. The argument follows beyond the fact that corporations favor the substance of 
Delaware’s law.  Indeed, corporations may prefer Delaware’s legislature, which some have 
suggested rarely overrules established precedent and allows the Court of Chancery to create 
solid case law.  It is the willingness of the legislature to defer to the Chancery Court that, in 
part, makes Delaware a favorable corporate location.  Id.  See generally Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1749, 1752 (2006) (discussing the creation of Delaware corporate law from an insider’s 
perspective). 
 95. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 726 (stating that even if a state could replicate 
Delaware’s corporate code, it would lack a judiciary that is as capable or esteemed as the 
Court of Chancery). 
 96. Daines, supra note 10, at 1560 (citing his previous work, Robert Daines, Does 
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 532 (2001) (finding that, all 
other things being equal, incorporating in Delaware raises a company’s value by up to 2%)). 
 97. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 726 (“It is true that by emulating Delaware a 
competitor state would not deliver the same product that Delaware does.  Copying Delaware 
statutory law would not obviate the need for an expert court and, even with such a court, the 
competitor would lack Delaware’s reputation.”). 
 98. Daines, supra note 10, at 1584.  Daines states: 
[M]anagers do not choose domicile themselves but instead hire others (lawyers) to 
advise them.  Once we allow that managers rely on agents, it is natural to ask 
whether agents’ self-interests might affect their advice. 
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Some assert that it is not just the overall strength of a state’s corporate 
code, but the nature of certain specific types of laws that affect a 
company’s incorporation decision.  One notable study suggests that a 
company’s incorporation choice is highly influenced by a state’s 
antitakeover laws99: a survey of publicly traded companies found that 
corporations prefer to incorporate in states where hostile takeovers are 
made difficult by the legislative process.100 
Another advantage that Delaware has over competing states stems 
from the Court of Chancery’s equitable powers over corporate disputes.101  
In comparison, North Carolina’s legislature established the Business Court 
to exercise jurisdiction over corporate and most commercial claims, 
widening the court’s scope beyond what most companies desire.102  After 
all, the Business Court often hears contract disputes, tort claims, and other 
conflicts with a sought-after legal remedy, whereas the Court of Chancery 
resolves only corporate cases primarily involving fiduciary-duty disputes, 
stock disputes, temporary injunctions, and other corporate matters in which 
the plaintiff has demanded performance or forbearance from a specific act.  
In contrast, one study shows that most business courts were created not to 
attract incorporations, but to “streamline commercial litigation.”103  This 
suggests that while the Business Court may improve the adjudication of 
 
 One agency-cost hypothesis is that local lawyers encourage local incorporation 
because it is in their interest, while “national” law firms (i.e., those with clients in 
many states) encourage incorporation in Delaware. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 99. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 88, at 387.  Bebchuk and Cohen find: 
At one end of the spectrum, states with no antitakeover statutes, such as 
California, do poorly and retain a relatively small fraction of the companies 
located in them.  At the other end of the spectrum, states that amass most or all 
standard antitakeover statutes are the most successful both in retaining in-state 
firms and in attracting out-of-state firms. 
Id. 
 100. Id. (mentioning that corporations prefer to incorporate in states where its board of 
directors are better insulated from hostile takeovers). 
 101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 111 (2012) (granting the Chancery Court jurisdiction over 
most corporate disputes). 
 102. Coyle, supra note 10, at 1953 (citing Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4).  Coyle argues: 
This expansive jurisdictional focus suggests that these courts were not designed 
primarily to attract incorporations.  If this was the goal, then one would expect 
these courts to have a jurisdictional ambit more narrowly targeted on corporate 
law—that is, the law that is most relevant to companies considering whether to 
reincorporate under the law of another state.  They do not. 
Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 712). 
 103. Id. at 1955 (citing Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 715). 
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business disputes, its design may lack the mechanisms necessary to attract 
foreign corporations. 
Other states may also encounter difficulties in competing against 
Delaware’s corporate monopoly due to the Court of Chancery’s special role 
in the corporate-law arena.104  Professor Jill Fisch found that, compared to 
other states, a relatively significant portion of Delaware’s corporate body of 
law is derived from the Chancery Court,105 which is particularly adept at 
creating case law to counter fast-arising concerns in a timely manner.106  In 
fact, judge-made law may be optimal, considering that it is less susceptible 
to a shift in political winds than laws that are enacted by the legislature.107  
This suggests that other states would have a difficult time replicating this 
unique facet of Delaware’s unique legislative–judicial relationship. 
Even if a state is able to compete with Delaware, there is confusion 
surrounding the benefits and advantages of attracting corporate charters.  
There is a significant difference between relocating a company’s 
production and business and the decision of where to incorporate.  Even 
though a substantial number of companies have chosen to incorporate in 
Delaware, only a sparse few have moved local operations or facilities to the 
state.  The only local presence of most Delaware corporations is a mailbox 
 
 104. Fisch, supra note 82, at 1081.  Fisch concludes: 
Delaware’s unusual lawmaking structure enhances firm value and perhaps 
explains the widespread preference for Delaware incorporation.  Delaware’s 
lawmaking process is valuable in three ways.  First, Delaware’s indeterminate 
corporate law may have benefits as well as costs.  Indeterminacy induces 
negotiation and removes some incentives for strategic behavior.  Indeterminate 
law also gives the courts greater flexibility.  Second, Delaware’s lawmaking is 
uniquely structured to maximize responsiveness to changing business 
developments.  Finally by vesting a high degree of legislative lawmaking power in 
a decisionmaker that is largely insulated from political pressure, Delaware reduces 
the potential for rent-seeking in connection with the lawmaking process. 
Id. 
 105. Id. at 1074 (“Delaware corporate law relies on judicial lawmaking to a greater 
extent than other states.  Other state statutes, for example, define the standard of care 
applicable to corporate directors; the Delaware statute does not.”). 
 106. Id. at 1064, 1077 (asserting that the “flexibility, responsiveness, insulation from 
undue political influence, and transparency” offered by Delaware lawmaking “increase 
Delaware’s ability to adjust its corporate law to changes in the business world” and that 
“Delaware decisional law is also characterized by a high degree of flexibility and 
responsiveness”). 
 107. See id. at 1072 (“Unlike legislatures, courts rarely change legal rules as a result of a 
shift in political power or a rejection of the policies that motivated the adoption of the 
original rule, preferring to leave those decisions for the legislative process.”). 
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and registered agent to receive service.108  The primary benefit that 
Delaware receives from this structure is the franchise fee charged to those 
companies that have incorporated in the state,109 though this is no 
insignificant amount, totaling approximately $440 million per year.110  Said 
differently, Delaware receives few statewide economic benefits from 
Delaware corporations beyond the rents accrued from chartering fees and 
franchise taxes. 
C. Creation and Retention of Business 
Some say that an effective business court will attract transient 
businesses to North Carolina or help the state to retain companies that are 
already operating local facilities.111  One article found that the recent 
growth of state business courts was motivated by the belief that out-of-
town businesses prefer and would relocate to jurisdictions that offer 
sophisticated and specialized mechanisms to adjudicate business 
disputes.112  The presence of a business court could also indicate a state’s 
 
 108. See Coyle, supra note 10, at 1940 (outlining the “[i]rrelevance of [d]ispute 
[r]esolution” in attracting, or retaining, out-of-state businesses). 
 109. Id. at 1951 (mentioning that states primarily seek corporate charters in order to 
capitalize upon the fees accrued from corporate charters); Renee L. Crean, Case Law 
Update, Recent Development in New York Law, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 695, 696–97 (1998) 
(arguing that New York’s business court could help New York accrue millions in franchise 
fees); Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 687–88. 
 110. Fisch, supra note 82, at 1061. 
 111. See, e.g., Nees, supra note 3, at 491.  Nees remarks: 
Attracting business in the form of corporate registrations and filed cases is a 
secondary purpose of creating specialized business courts.  The business attracted 
by business courts is two-fold: it is believed to help boost the state’s reputation as 
a favorable state of incorporation as well as bringing in, and retaining, cases into 
the state courts, which are consequently represented by local counsel . . . . 
Id.; see also O’Brien, supra note 1, at 367 (“State officials believe the Business Court will 
attract out-of-state businesses to the state by developing their understanding of North 
Carolina corporate law.”). 
 112. Coyle, supra note 10, at 1934–35.  Coyle states: 
The first, and by far the most popular, theory of economic competition cites the 
business court as the product of competition among states to attract business 
activity.  This theory suggests that the creation of a business court serves both to 
attract out-of-state companies to the state and to keep in-state companies from 
moving their operations elsewhere.  Under this theory, states that compete 
successfully by establishing business courts will enjoy faster economic 
development and job growth than states that do not. 
Id. 
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willingness to create a business-friendly climate.113 
Whether a business court would actually attract or retain industries, 
jobs, and revenue is a more difficult question.  Some scholars suggest that 
corporations are unlikely to relocate operations,114 considering that low tax 
rates, subsidies, and other economic carrots are substantially more likely to 
influence decisions regarding where to place production.115  In fact, it 
logically follows that corporate bodies of law should rarely attract outside 
businesses, since firms may incorporate in any state and take advantage of 
its legal system without assuming the step of relocating facilities.  It thus 
appears more likely that a business court could attract corporate charters 
than it would for the court to convince foreign corporations to transport 
operations to North Carolina.  However, there is a realistic chance that 
improving North Carolina’s business judiciary could render significant 
benefits to the state’s legal community. 
D. Attracting Litigation and Other Legal Work 
Local interest groups, particularly lawyers, could prosper from the 
increased workload derived from the Business Court.  Business Court 
advocates cite the substantial sum of Chancery Court litigation as a likely 
intended consequence of a firm’s incorporation choice.116  A litigant who 
seeks to file an action against a corporation may often choose between 
several state forums, though the Constitution imposes limitations.117   
 
 113. Nees, supra note 3, at 491 (noting that many advocates believe that a business court 
can bolster a state’s business reputation). 
 114. Coyle, supra note 10, at 1940–41. 
 115. Id.; see supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 698.  Kahan and Kamar posit that: 
Lawyers in other states may be able to generate revenues proportionate to those of 
Delaware lawyers to the extent that their states attract incorporations.  Since 
Delaware’s market share of roughly 50% of incorporations by public companies 
yields $165 million in income and $227 million in revenue from legal business, 
lawyers in another state would likely gain about $3.3 million in income and $4.5 
million in revenue for each percentage increase in their state’s market share of 
public corporations. 
Id.; see also Jones, supra note 2, at 196 (discussing the intent of Business Court designers to 
model the court after the Delaware Chancery Court to help attract corporate charters similar 
to Delaware). 
 117. See John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1351 (2012) 
[hereinafter Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act] (explaining that a plaintiff can choose 
to file a corporate lawsuit against a corporation in the company’s state of incorporation and 
where its principal place of business or headquarters is located, plus potentially other states). 
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The primary restriction concerns whether a potential forum court can 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, which is established by 
either general or specific jurisdiction.118  A court has specific jurisdiction 
over a corporate defendant when both the context of the dispute and the 
actions of the company have a sufficient nexus and minimum contacts that 
make it fair and foreseeable for the company to be brought to court in the 
forum.119  General jurisdiction exists when the defendant has substantial 
 
 118. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (stating that general 
jurisdiction over a defendant is appropriate only when the corporation’s affiliations with the 
state in which the lawsuit is brought “are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] 
essentially at home in the forum State” (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2001))).  In Goodyear, the United States Supreme Court 
held: 
 A state court’s assertion of jurisdiction exposes defendants to the State’s 
coercive power, and is therefore subject to review for compatibility with the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. . . . 
. . . .  
 A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-
country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their 
affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render them 
essentially at home in the forum State. . . . Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, 
depends on an “affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,” 
principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is 
therefore subject to the State’s regulation. 
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850–51 (alteration in original) (first quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 317 (1945); then quoting Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald 
T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 
1136 (1966)); see also John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 605, 606 (2012) [hereinafter Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?].   
Armour and his colleagues note: 
[P]laintiffs can sue wherever they can achieve both personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Both of these are available in Delaware, so Delaware is one possible 
and often convenient forum.  However, plaintiff lawyers can typically also obtain 
jurisdiction and thus sue a company’s directors and officers in the state courts of 
its “home state” (where its headquarters are located) . . . . 
Id. 
 119. The current framework for determining “minimum contacts” was set forth in 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, whereby a Delaware corporation, located with a 
principal place of business in Missouri, refused to pay a tax to the State of Washington 
based upon salesmen residing therein.  Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 311.  Upon Washington 
bringing suit against International Shoe Co. in the state, the Court sought to establish 
whether the state could establish personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state corporation.  Id. 
at 316.  The Court held: 
[D]ue process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain 
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and continuous contacts with the forum.120  In the corporate context, 
general jurisdiction is satisfied when the company is virtually “at home” in 
the forum state, such as in the location of a company’s headquarters or 
principal place of business, or even in a state in which the company sells a 
high volume of products.121  
Because it is possible to initiate litigation wherever a company is 
incorporated, attracting corporate charters creates value for the 
incorporating state’s legal community.122  For instance, Delaware’s legal 
community receives a substantial benefit from the number of companies 
that have consented to being sued in the state and from the corporations 
that must employ local counsel to effectuate transactional work.123  This 
can be inferred from the Delaware Bar’s denial of reciprocity to all out-of-
state attorneys.124  Out-of-state lawyers seeking to represent a client in the 
Court of Chancery must partner with local Delaware counsel to share in 
both the litigation responsibilities and the attendant legal fees.125 
Importantly, however, certain qualities of a state’s judiciary likely 
influence where a lawsuit is ultimately filed, considering that plaintiffs 
generally have a choice to bring an action in any court that can exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation.126  Litigants thus have 
 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 
Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 120. See id. at 317. 
 121. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54.  In Goodyear, the Court reiterated that general 
jurisdiction is satisfied when a corporation is “fairly regarded as at home,” referring to 
whether the forum state is the corporation’s principal place of business or situs of 
incorporation.  Id. (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 
TEX. L. REV. 721, 728 (1988)).   
 122. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics 
of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 467–68 (2015) (discussing 
Delaware’s incentive in both drawing charters and potential litigants as well as providing an 
attractive forum for both defendant and plaintiff litigants). 
 123. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 694–95. 
 124. It is generally stated that only ten states deny any form of reciprocity.  See, e.g., 
Delaware Bar Exam Information: Reciprocity, BOARD L. EXAMINERS SUP. CT. DEL., 
https://media.law.wisc.edu/m/zdd3f/de.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2015) (explaining that the 
state has no reciprocity agreements with other states). 
 125. David L. Finger & Louis J. Finger, Delaware Trial Handbook § 1:8. Admission Pro 
Hac Vice, FINGER & SLANINA, LLC, http://www.delawgroup.com/delaware-trial-handbook-
§-18-admission-pro-hac-vice/ (last visited May 12, 2015). 
 126. See Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, supra note 118, at 608 n.12.  
Armour explains: 
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a host of options to bring suit, including in a forum where a company is 
incorporated, in any other state where sufficient contacts exist, and in 
corresponding federal courts.  Some suggest that the choice of where to file 
a lawsuit depends on where litigants perceive that they can find a 
competent and respected judiciary.127  It is thus argued that businesses are 
more likely to incorporate in Delaware so that they may litigate their 
corporate disputes in the Court of Chancery.128  Others argue that the path 
to court is more strategic, considering that the act of attracting litigation 
requires incentivizing both the defendant and plaintiff.129  After all, 
plaintiffs will likely file suit in courts that are known to be sympathetic to 
their causes, such as a hometown court against a foreign defendant.130 
However, defendants will likely also seek to avoid such states when 
making the incorporation decision.131  For example, the State of West 
Virginia is reputed to be a particularly hostile forum for out-of-state 
corporations, which makes companies unlikely to incorporate in that 
 
States typically have courts of general jurisdiction, so subject matter jurisdiction is 
not a concern.  Personal jurisdiction over the company’s officers will normally be 
easy, since most will work and often live in the company’s home state.  The fact 
that most companies hold at least some board meetings at their headquarters 
should provide the minimum contacts with directors needed for personal 
jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 127. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An 
Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held 
Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1479 (2009) (indicating that litigants 
often prefer certain qualities that they seek out in a litigation forum, and that this 
arrangement creates predictability and repeatable patterns whereby certain venues become 
the dominant and routine choice). 
 128. Id. at 1480. 
 129. Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 117, at 1345. 
 130. Id. at 1350.  Armour explains: 
It cannot be taken for granted, however, that corporate litigation will be launched 
in Delaware courts.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys usually have a choice of venue when 
filing a corporate suit.  If they perceive that filing outside Delaware is 
advantageous, they may well do so.  They might avoid Delaware because they 
believe its judges tend to favor corporate defendants. 
Id. 
 131. Id. at 1345 (finding that in order to retain litigation, Delaware and other forums 
must appeal to both defendants and plaintiffs); id. (“If Delaware accommodates litigation 
too readily, companies fearful of lawsuits, may incorporate elsewhere.  But if plaintiffs’ 
attorneys find the Delaware courts unwelcoming, they can often file cases in other courts.”); 
see also Cain & Solomon, supra note 122, at 468 (noting that plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
strategic actors who respond to judicial developments in deciding in which court to file 
suit). 
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state.132  Corporations may also choose to incorporate in their home state in 
hopes of exploiting favorable treatment by local judges and juries.133  A 
state’s judiciary could also seek to insulate out-of-state corporate 
defendants from liability, yet doing so would encourage plaintiffs to file 
lawsuits in the corporation’s principal place of business or in another state 
where they have minimum contacts for a court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over them.134 
Importantly, parties can often negotiate the site of future litigation by 
contract.135  One study found that contracts often use forum-selection 
clauses to designate the Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum for 
disputes, and choice-of-law provisions that select Delaware law to govern 
corporate disputes, but that New York is often chosen for contract and 
other commercial conflicts.136  In some limited instances, parties agree to 
arbitrate later-arising conflicts, the frequency of which may increase, 
considering that the Chancery Court has sought to capitalize on this 
market.137  Because litigation forums are often bargained ex ante, it should 
 
 132. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2012 STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS 
SURVEY: LAWSUIT CLIMATE 7 (2012), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/ 
reports/lr_FinalWeb_PDF.pdf (rating West Virginia as the worst or second-worst judiciary 
for tort liability for all years surveyed). 
 133. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 88, at 398–99.  Bebchuk and Cohen suggest that 
firms may incorporate at home because doing so gives them “hope of getting favorable 
treatment”: 
Even though a state is supposed to treat all firms incorporated in it in the same 
way regardless of where they are located, a firm located in a state—especially a 
large firm located in a small state—might hope that its stature and clout in the 
state would lead judges or public officials to give it favorable treatment with 
respect to some corporate law issues that might arise. 
Id. 
 134. See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 117, at 1347–48 
(explaining the forum-balancing act where, in order to attract litigation, forum states must 
first induce potential defendant corporations to incorporate in their state with certain bodies 
of law, but also to provide a legal landscape whereby plaintiffs will choose the state to file 
an action). 
 135. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596 (1991) (holding that a 
forum-selection clause was valid); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 127, at 1476–77 
(explaining that many types of contracts include forum-selection and choice-of-law 
provisions to govern where prospective disputes must be brought). 
 136. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 127, at 1477–78 (finding that contracting parties 
select Delaware law most often regarding choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions for 
certain issues of corporate law; however, New York law is most frequently chosen for most 
other forms of financing and commercial law disputes). 
 137. See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 520–21 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(finding unconstitutional Delaware’s attempt to run private, confidential arbitration hearings 
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be expected that plaintiffs and defendants would be more likely to mutually 
select an expert, distinguished judiciary, thus creating market dominance.138  
This is, again, why forum-selection clauses in corporate contracts typically 
designate the State of Delaware as the exclusive forum for disputes, while 
commercial disputes find a home in New York. 
A notably understudied variable is a litigant’s taste for federal courts, 
where a large number of corporate cases are decided, although most 
theoretical and empirical analyses indicate that Delaware’s biggest 
litigation threat comes from other states.139  It appears that the federal 
courts have little desire to usurp corporate disputes, and that both plaintiffs 
and corporate defendants have no preference to leave the state courts.140  In 
other words, attracting litigation is a delicate balancing act whereby the 
 
in the Court of Chancery for business disputes where at least one million dollars is in 
controversy); see also Brian JM Quinn, Arbitration and the Future of Delaware’s Corporate 
Law Franchise, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 829, 830–31 (2013) (mentioning that 
Delaware’s attempt to accommodate arbitration as a forum choice hints at its growing 
importance and likely prominence). 
 138. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 127, at 1479 (explaining that contracting parties 
should desire certain qualities in a judiciary and thus contract for a forum that can provide 
such qualities).  Eisenberg and Miller state: 
Parties presumably care about certainty and predictability.  This can be achieved 
by development of a substantial body of reasonable case law in any locale.  Once 
the venue is perceived as having a lead in legal development, that lead should 
induce more parties to contract for that state’s law to govern.  Therefore choices 
of law may cluster around a few states for various contracts type on grounds of 
predictability. 
Id. 
 139. See Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger 
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1101 (2013).  Griffith and Lahav state: 
Delaware has little to fear when its cases are brought in federal court, as many 
recently have been.  Although it may be true that the principal threat to Delaware 
is the federal government, not rival states, the federal government exercises its 
power by preempting Delaware law through legislation and rulemaking.  There is 
little threat in a federal judge hearing the occasional Delaware case.  Moreover, in 
the absence of federal incorporation, federal judges have even less incentive than 
rival state judges to encourage merger litigation in their jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 140. But see Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 117, at 1355 fig.2, 
1358 fig.4 (showing that corporate business cases are increasingly filed in federal courts, 
despite the lack of research on the subject, and also, representing the increase in mergers 
and acquisition cases in federal courts relative to other courts); see also RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 216 (1985) (noting that “it is 
widely believed that federal judges are, on average . . . of higher quality than their state 
counterparts”); id. at 215 (noting out-of-state defendants’ preference for federal court over 
state court because of “the problem of ‘local bias’”). 
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judiciary must favor businesses enough to attract corporate charters, but 
only to the degree that plaintiffs will choose the location to bring suit. 
It is possible, then, that the North Carolina Business Court could have 
the effect of increasing statewide litigation, rendering significant local 
benefits to a certain limited industry of actors.  Since litigants appear 
rationally motivated, the Business Court could prompt companies to 
incorporate in North Carolina or to draft North Carolina as the designated 
choice of forum or choice of law in their business contracts.141   
While previous arguments remain relevant, such as those that suggest 
that traditional litigation homes such as Delaware are too entrenched,142 
litigation choices may be more dynamic; in fact, current research indicates 
that plaintiffs’ lawyers have started to direct lawsuits away from Delaware 
into nontraditional forums.143  It is possible that the Business Court could 
present such an attractive forum that plaintiffs’ lawyers will choose to 
litigate in North Carolina,144 or that local lawyers might decide to stay in 
their home state rather than litigate in Delaware or other similar states.  
Although certain methods could empirically test whether the Business 
Court has increased local legal work,145 the real litigation benefits of the 
forum have yet to be discovered.   
Considering that lawyers are renowned for being risk averse, the 
Business Court’s recent rise to prominence may soon begin to produce 
fruit, even if current testing shows no particular movement.  Indeed, few 
companies desire to be North Carolina’s test subject while the state’s 
judiciary seeks to create more expansive case law.146  But after the litigants 
 
 141. See Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 117, at 1392 (arguing that 
litigants value certain qualities in a judiciary or legal system and thus rationally pursue such 
qualities using contract terms or via ex post litigation strategies). 
 142. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4, at 726 (noting that a state that chooses to copy 
Delaware law would not usurp much of Delaware’s corporate advantage because it could 
not replicate the Court of Chancery’s reputation). 
 143. Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 117, at 1359 (finding that 
corporate-takeover cases are becoming more likely to be filed and tried in states other than 
Delaware). 
 144. See, e.g., Premier, Inc. v. Peterson, No. 11 CVS 1054, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 61, at *4 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2012) (noting that the action was properly before the court because 
the parties, almost all of whom were incorporated out of state, chose North Carolina to 
govern future disputes), vacated on other grounds, 755 S.E.2d 56 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). 
 145. See infra notes 147–203 and accompanying text (empirically testing whether the 
Business Court has helped North Carolina attract corporations and litigation). 
 146. Holland, supra note 39, at 778–79 (noting that businesses prefer extensive case law 
for the sake of predictability and ex ante business planning (quoting William H. Rehnquist, 
31
Day: Revisiting the North Carolina Business Court After Twenty Years
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
308 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:277 

who lack other forum choices help add to the Business Court’s 
predictability, parties may later prefer to litigate in North Carolina over 
neighboring states.  Thus, even modest or null results should be understood 
in this context.  With this background, the next Part provides an empirical 
assessment for whether the Business Court has already produced local 
benefits. 
III. ASSESSING THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE BUSINESS COURT 
Most predictions about the Business Court’s ability to produce 
statewide benefits were formed by theoretical expectations backed by no 
empirical data.  Some anecdotal evidence suggests that companies, when 
given a choice among litigation forums, choose North Carolina because of 
the Business Court’s ability to adjudicate complex business disputes.147 
Empirically, no statistics prove or disprove whether the Business 
Court has been successful, though some trends are suggestive.  Even in 
light of the suggestive nature of the data, no statistics can definitively prove 
more than a correlation between the variables.  Considering that there are a 
variety of ways in which the Business Court could benefit North 
Carolina,148 several empirical methods are relevant.  For instance, recall 
that North Carolina leaders often refer to Delaware’s Chancery Court when 
discussing the likely virtues of the Business Court.  Since Delaware’s 
primary claim is that it has accrued more corporate charters than any other 
 
The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of 
Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992))). 
 147. See Lijun K. Yang, Note, First Union v. SunTrust Banks: The Fight for Wachovia 
and Its Impact on North Carolina Corporate Law, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 335 (2002) 
(examining the history and consequences of First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 
01-CVS-10075, 2001 NCBC LEXIS 7 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001)).   
  In First Union, the parties filed complaints in several state courts, but eventually 
selected North Carolina, citing the benefits offered by the Business Court.  See First Union, 
2001 NCBC LEXIS 7; see also Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the 
Creation and Jurisdiction of Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 147, 169 
(2004) (citing the parties’ recognition of the Business Court as a “trustworthy and capable 
forum”); Yang, supra, at 337–38. 
  The decision of the parties in First Union to litigate in North Carolina caused some 
in Georgia to advocate for a similar business court.  See Bach & Applebaum, supra, at 170 
(“[L]awyers are actively seeking assignment to the North Carolina Business Court, 
including lawyers from adjacent states, motivated by the court’s understanding of complex 
business matters, predictability, fairness, and impartiality.  This sounds like the oft-heard 
description of the qualities litigants find in Delaware’s Chancery Court.”). 
 148. See supra notes 70–146 and accompanying text (detailing the possible ways that the 
Business Court may provide local benefits to the State of North Carolina). 
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state,149 could the Business Court replicate part of Delaware’s success by 
increasing the rate of incorporation in North Carolina? 
The numbers suggest that the skeptical scholars are correct that the 
Business Court will not help states compete against Delaware, rendering 
little effect upon corporate chartering.  This Article presents a dataset that 
was constructed using methodology adopted by other studies regarding the 
incorporation choices of North American publicly traded companies.  
While there is value in studying nonpublic companies, there is a lack of 
assessable data pertaining to all companies.  In contrast, a plentiful sum of 
information concerning publicly traded companies can be found in the 
dataset Compustat.150  Thus, most research that studies corporations 
assesses only publicly traded companies.   
The first analysis scrutinized publicly traded companies that have their 
principal place of business in North Carolina.  Keeping in mind that the 
choice of where to incorporate is primarily bimodal, whereby companies 
choose either their home state or Delaware,151 if the Business Court is a 
truly attractive incorporation home to North Carolina companies, one 
would assume that North Carolina companies, at an increasing rate, are 
deciding to stay at home instead of incorporating in Delaware.  After all, 
incorporating out of state comes with certain costs, including the risk of 
litigating out of state and relinquishing the home-court advantage.152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 149. See Daines, supra note 10, at 1562, 1573 tbl.4 (stating that “97% of public firms 
incorporate either in their home state or Delaware” (emphasis omitted)); see also Jones, 
supra note 2, at 196–97 (noting that the North Carolina Commission on Business Laws and 
the Economy cited Delaware and the Chancery Court as a model in proposing the Business 
Court). 
 150. Compustat Financials, S&P CAP. IQ, https://www.capitaliq.com/home/what-we-
offer/information-you-need/financials-valuation/compustat-financials.aspx (last visited May 
20, 2015). 
 151. See Daines, supra note 10, at 1562. 
 152. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 88, at 398–99 (discussing that some corporations 
perceive that local judges may give favorable treatment to home-state residents and 
businesses). 
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Figure 1: Percentage of North Carolina Corporations that  
Incorporate in North Carolina 
 


The patterns of North Carolina corporations were striking.153  First, the 
number of publicly traded North Carolina corporations has decreased over 
the years, though this phenomenon mimics the national trend.154  In 1988, 
before the Business Court was established, publicly traded North Carolina 
companies chose to incorporate in North Carolina and Delaware at a near-
equal rate, with each state claiming approximately 40% of the corporate 
market share and other third-party states taking the remaining 20%.155  
Entering the 1990s, Delaware’s market share of North Carolina companies 
slowly increased, rising to almost 45% in 1996 when the Business Court 
was enacted.156  Therefore, at some point in the 2000s, it could be expected 
that North Carolina would reclaim some of these corporate charters away 
from Delaware.  Instead, Delaware’s claim to North Carolina corporations 
 
 153. See supra Figure 1. 
 154. See Michael Santoli, The Stock Market Is ‘Shrinking,’ Despite Record-High 
Indexes, YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 6, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/michael-
santoli/the-stock-market-is--shrinking---despite-record-high-indexes-171141756.html 
(observing that “[t]here are fewer publicly traded companies on American exchanges than at 
any time since at least 1990”). 
 155.  See supra Figure 1. 
 156. See supra Figure 1.  
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grew to the detriment of North Carolina.  By the late 2000s, 48% of North 
Carolina firms were calling Delaware home—a number that grew above 
50% in the late 2000s.157 
On the other hand, as shown in Figure 2, the number of North 
Carolina publicly traded companies incorporated in North Carolina has 
dramatically dropped.   
Figure 2: The Decline of Out-of-State Public Companies in  
North Carolina 

When the Business Court was first established in North Carolina, only 
about 38% of local companies had chosen North Carolina as their 
incorporation home.158  Ten years later, the number precipitously dropped 
to 32%.159  Today, less than 30% of firms incorporate in North Carolina.160  
Indeed, despite the Business Court’s prominence, North Carolina continues 
to lose the competition for corporate charters to Delaware—as well as the 
other forty-eight states whose share has remained constant at around 20% 
of the North Carolina market.161 
The competition for corporate charters is also about attracting foreign 
companies into North Carolina, not just retaining North Carolina 
companies, as previously studied.  In 1998, two years after the Business 
157. See supra Figure 1.
158. See supra Figure 1.
159. See supra Figure 1.
160. See supra Figure 1.
161. See supra Figure 2.
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Court’s enactment, North Carolina was the home of incorporation to 
eighty-six foreign publicly traded companies—a number that would decline 
at a faster rate than Delaware or the national average.162  Just four years 
later, that number fell to seventy-four, and in 2008, only fifty-three publicly 
traded companies were incorporated in North Carolina.163 
Importantly, in 2001, 20% of North Carolina incorporations were 
companies that had a principal place of business located out of state.164  
That number stayed constant and then began to drop quickly.165  By 2011, 
only 10% of North Carolina incorporations arrived from out of state, and 
today, just barely over 8% of these firms have an out-of-state principal 
place of business.166  Indeed, North Carolina is failing to retain 
incorporations of publicly traded companies from both in-state and out-of-
state companies.167  In 2013, only four out-of-state companies were 
incorporated in North Carolina, compared to the fourteen that had 
incorporated in North Carolina in 2000.168  Despite the presence of the 
Business Court, North Carolina is failing to compete for publicly held 
companies.169 
While the number of publicly traded companies declined nationwide, 
including in Delaware and in North Carolina, the number of North Carolina 
incorporations dropped at a far greater rate than in Delaware.  While 
Delaware lost a bit of ground in the national market share, it had lost far 
more than North Carolina.170  It appears that firms have begun to choose 
other nontraditional states, such as Nevada, though the companies are 
definitely not selecting North Carolina, regardless of the promise of the 
Business Court.171 
Another method in which the incorporation challenge can be viewed is 
through the activity of the Business Court and the rate at which North 
Carolina incorporates new companies, whether publicly or privately held.  
The North Carolina Secretary of State’s Office provides data regarding the 
number of corporations that have chosen to incorporate in North 
 
 162. See supra Figure 2. 
 163. See supra Figure 2. 
 164. See supra Figure 2. 
 165. See supra Figure 2. 
 166. See supra Figure 2. 
 167. See supra Figure 2. 
 168. See supra Figure 2. 
 169. See supra Figure 2 (showing this trend). 
 170. See supra Figure 2. 
 171. See supra Figure 2. 
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Carolina.172  That agency keeps statistics on two types of new companies: 
foreign and domestic.173  Domestic refers to companies residing in North 
Carolina who have chosen to incorporate in the state, while foreign 
companies are international companies or those from other states who have 
incorporated in North Carolina.  Both of these categories of corporations 
have independent significance, considering that North Carolina companies 
can always elect to incorporate elsewhere, while the number of new foreign 
corporations is instructive, since these companies have chosen North 
Carolina over the traditional bimodal choice of Delaware or their respective 
home state.174 
During the early 1990s, before the creation of the Business Court, the 
rate at which companies elected to incorporate in North Carolina remained 
steady.175  Even in 1993, when 8% more North Carolina companies 
incorporated locally than in 1992, the number of foreign incorporations 
stayed fairly constant (less than a 3% increase).176  Interestingly, the 
number of foreign and domestic corporations in North Carolina began to 
increase at a noticeable rate during the years in which local leaders planned 
to operate a Business Court—68% more foreign corporations chose North 
Carolina in 1998 than in 1994 (5733 to 3413).177 
The Business Court’s promise, though, began to appear more like a 
fluke shortly thereafter, as the number of foreign corporations suddenly 
decreased.  From 1998 to 1999, the number of new foreign corporations 
dropped by almost 8%, and then in 2001, this number decreased by another 
9%.178  The number slipped again slightly in 2002.179  One possible 
explanation for the decline in foreign corporations is the Business Court’s 
inactivity during that time.  Indeed, the number of cases that the Business 
Court decided during that period remained low, as the court generally 
 
 172. See infra Table 1. 
 173. See infra Table 1. 
 174. See infra Table 1. 
 175. See supra Figure 2; infra Table 1. 
 176. See supra Figure 2; infra Table 1. 
 177. See infra Table 1.  The number of domestic corporations that incorporated in North 
Carolina also increased during that same period (43%), though this number is less helpful, 
because many more intervening variables muddy this relationship.  See id.  Because the 
historic choice of incorporation has been between the company’s home state and Delaware, 
a foreign company’s choice to go against the grain and incorporate in North Carolina sheds 
more light on the question. 
 178. See infra Table 1. 
 179. See infra Table 1. 
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released only around eleven opinions annually (in both 1999 and 2000).180  
In 2002, the court released only four opinions.181  If experts predicted that 
companies are strategic actors who would choose where to incorporate 
based, in part, on the ability of a locale to adjudicate business disputes, then 
the decline of new foreign incorporations made sense.  After all, the 
Business Court must actually be active and effective for foreign 
corporations to seek out its benefits.  If this is a spurious relationship, one 
can still certainly conclude that the Business Court was not helping to 
improve this situation during that time. 
As shown in Table 1, the number of foreign corporations entering 
North Carolina then began to fluctuate.182 
   
Table 1: Creations, Dissolutions, and Withdrawals of Domestic and 
Foreign Corporations in North Carolina Through September 2013183 
 
Calendar 
Year 
Creations Voluntary Destruction 
Documents 
Domestic Foreign Dissolutions Withdrawals 
1990 14,566 2,369 1,198 448 
1991 14,049 2,294 1,612 619 
1992 15,179 2,817 1,757 705 
1993 16,428 2,896 1,522 568 
1994 20,200 3,413 1,669 915 
1995 22,648 3,922 1,958 731 
1996 25,165 4,547 2,318 833 
1997 28,118 5,188 2,231 950 
1998 29,030 5,733 2,371 1,088 
1999 32,611 5,630 3,078 1,270 
2000 36,402 6,418 3,625 1,445 
2001 34,623 5,816 4,761 1,977 
2002 38,754 5,772 5,565 1,976 
2003 41,518 6,010 5,900 2,063 
2004 48,289 6,517 8,035 2,338 
2005 54,132 7,110 8,721 2,185 
2006 56,285 8,362 10,126 2,298 
2007 58,930 8,627 12,121 2,843 
 
 180. See Court Opinions, supra note 60. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See infra Table 1. 
 183. Report from the N.C. Secretary of State’s Office (original on file with author).  This 
Table includes data reported through September 13, 2013.   
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2008 51,396 7,237 15,088 3,265 
2009 46,494 6,719 16,142 3,405 
2010 45,772 6,882 17,191 3,384 
2011 47,827 6,860 15,847 2,914 
2012 50,294 7,092 16,447 3,128 
2013 39,000 4,832 11,870 2,556 
 
For instance, the rate that foreign companies incorporated picked up in 
accordance with the number of decisions that the court issued.184  In 2006, 
when the number of opinions increased from seven to twenty-six,185 the 
number of foreign corporations incorporating in North Carolina increased 
18% from 2005.186  The numbers began to dip again in the late 2000s,187 
which is likely a result of the rise of business courts in other states.188  
Indeed, many states perceived that they were losing businesses and 
corporations to those states with business courts, causing these states to 
create their own business courts.189  This is the very situation noted 
previously in this Article that took place between North Carolina and 
Georgia in the First Union case.190  While the number of domestic and 
foreign corporations that chose North Carolina annually has settled, the 
average gross number of new incorporations far exceeds pre-Business 
Court levels.191  The point is that it seems like the Business Court attracted 
the most foreign corporations and retained a significant number of local 
ones when it was one of the only business courts in the region, though its 
draw has settled now that many other states have employed this same 
judicial tool. 
Another area of possibility is whether the Business Court could help 
North Carolina attract litigation to the state.  Again, litigants can bring a 
lawsuit in any court that can exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants.192  Determining whether North Carolina is prospering in the 
 
 184. See supra Table 1; see also Court Opinions, supra note 60. 
 185. See Court Opinions, supra note 60. 
 186. See supra Table 1. 
 187. See supra Table 1. 
 188. See Applebaum, supra note 8, at 71 (showing a timeline of the introduction of 
business courts). 
 189. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 9, at 415 (advocating the creation of a business court to 
avoid losing business to other states that have specialized business courts). 
 190. See supra note 147 and accompanying text; see also Bach & Applebaum, supra 
note 147, at 170 (describing the choice to litigate in the North Carolina Business Court). 
 191. See supra Table 1; see also supra Figure 2. 
 192. See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
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competition for litigation is difficult, considering that it is impossible to 
truly understand a plaintiff’s or defendant’s litigation strategy, or how the 
case ended up in North Carolina.  For example, if a Georgia corporation 
with a principal place of business in Georgia files a lawsuit in North 
Carolina, it could be an indication that the corporation prefers the North 
Carolina Business Court over Georgia, Delaware, or any other state’s legal 
system; or the corporation could be suing North Carolina residents, and 
thus, North Carolina is the only proper jurisdiction under the minimum-
contacts standard.  That said, taken as a whole, one could possibly draw 
inferences from the changes in the number of foreign corporations that 
litigate in the North Carolina Business Court. 
In preparing this research, each opinion on the North Carolina 
Business Court’s website was analyzed.193  From there, the cases in which 
all of the parties were individuals, with no corporations represented, were 
removed.  Additionally, each case where a branch of the North Carolina 
government was a party to the lawsuit was eliminated, as well as the trusts 
and estates cases, since there is little possibility that these cases could have 
been filed in a different state.  The parties to each case were then 
researched, including their locations of incorporation and principal places 
of business.  Generally, this could be accomplished by referring to the 
cases themselves if the court announced the status of the parties.  
Otherwise, various secretary of state websites were reviewed in order to 
determine the status of the entities.   
The findings suggested that out-of-state corporations took full 
advantage of the North Carolina Business Court—at least at one point in 
time.  Here, an out-of-state corporation means a company that has chosen 
to incorporate elsewhere, despite whether it is has a local headquarters in 
North Carolina.  This is because even if a Delaware corporation has its 
principal place of business in North Carolina, it putatively chose to 
incorporate in Delaware in order to exploit its legal system.  
In the first couple of years, no out-of-state plaintiffs were represented 
in a Business Court opinion.194  As the Business Court’s activity grew, so 
did the proportion of plaintiffs hailing from out of state.195  In 2006, for 
example, an anomalous 81% of studied opinions contained at least one 
plaintiff party from out of state.196  While, again, some of these plaintiffs 
 
 193. Court Opinions, supra note 60.  The specific list of opinions studied is on file with 
the author, but all opinions can be accessed on the Business Court’s website.  See id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. 
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were compelled to file in North Carolina because it was the only proper 
forum, many of the plaintiffs assuredly selected North Carolina over other 
states.   
For example, in Premier, Inc. v. Peterson,197 the plaintiff sought a 
declaratory judgment with respect to a contested stock purchase 
agreement.198  The defendants, a group of companies and privates parties 
who sought to sell their stock in a certain company, hailed from out of 
state, and the plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, specifically endeavored to 
have the dispute brought before the North Carolina Business Court.199  In 
fact, the stock purchase agreement designated North Carolina law to govern 
the dispute, suggesting that North Carolina and the Business Court, in this 
instance, did attract certain out-of-state parties on both ex ante and ad hoc 
bases.200 
The percentage of plaintiffs that file from out of state then became 
more dynamic, yet still significant.  Generally, somewhere between 30% 
and 50% of the cases studied from any given year included a plaintiff from 
out of state.  This is highly suggestive that in some cases, out-of-state 
plaintiffs are selecting North Carolina as their home for litigation. 
Defendants seemed to find themselves in North Carolina at a rather 
significant rate as well.  This should not be surprising, particularly since 
North Carolina residents and businesses likely wish for their lawsuits to be 
litigated in North Carolina.  That said, usually around 50% of the studied 
cases included an out-of-state defendant, which is very significant 
considering that the site of litigation is often mutually agreed upon.   
For example, as multiple fragmented plaintiffs file lawsuits among a 
host of jurisdictions, creating multi-jurisdictional litigation, the parties 
often bargain as to which jurisdiction will become the home for 
litigation.201  In other cases, contracts provide the law and forum that will 
 
 197. Premier, Inc. v. Peterson, No. 11 CVS 1054, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 61 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 7, 2012), vacated, 755 S.E.2d 56 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). 
 198. Id. at *2. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at *4. 
 201. See Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who 
Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 24–25 (2012).  
Micheletti and Parker state: 
 Some companies are considering a broader solution to the multi-jurisdictional 
litigation problem than what can be employed within the confines of a particular 
case—specifically the use of “choice of forum” provisions in charters and bylaws.  
These provisions address typical state law deal litigation claims—such as breach 
of fiduciary duty and other stockholder-related claims—and require them to be 
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govern disputes, such as in Premier.202  Even though defendants are not the 
parties filing lawsuits, they often have control over which forums and 
venues will adjudicate a conflict.  Therefore, the staggering number of 
studied cases with a defendant corporation from out of state is significant, 
especially considering the number of cases that contain an out-of-state 
plaintiff.  It seems that parties are amenable to—or even prefer—North 
Carolina and the Business Court’s jurisdiction. 
Again, the choice to incorporate is distinct from where a company 
does its business.  Unfortunately, this is a rather difficult, if not impossible, 
concept to measure.  This is especially true when one considers the 
inability to parse through the many reasons why a company may elect to 
incorporate in the state.  While scholars have suggested that a company is 
unlikely to move operations to North Carolina solely for the sake of the 
Business Court203—after all, the same advantages could be obtained by 
incorporating—it is possible that the Business Court has played a role in 
retaining some business.  Although I believe that the Business Court’s role 
here is negligible, particularly when considering the larger influence of tax 
rates and regulatory systems, more research is needed in this area to draw a 
proper conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, the North Carolina Business Court has likely improved the 
adjudication of corporate and business disputes in the state.  Many local 
leaders predicted that this dynamic would render advantages similar to the 
Court of Chancery.  After exploring the Court of Chancery’s 
accomplishments and how the Business Court functions in comparison, it 
appears that both the Business Court’s critics and supporters are correct.  
The critics properly identified that companies will seldom relocate 
activities to North Carolina, considering that the advantages of relocating 
can be realized by simply incorporating in the state.  However, the critics 
were overly pessimistic about the Business Court’s ability to attract 
corporate charters and outside legal business.   
The Business Court will probably never threaten Delaware’s 
established corporate expertise.  Nonetheless, the Business Court has 
 
filed in a more manageable single forum (usually the state of incorporation, which 
is typically Delaware). 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 202. Premier, 2012 NCBC LEXIS 61, at *4. 
 203. See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 10; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 4. 
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helped North Carolina to become a formidable corporate figure in its region 
for smaller corporations, and possibly for larger publicly traded companies.  
Earlier scholarship suggested that the historic corporate decision was 
bimodal in the sense that firms generally choose to incorporate in their 
home state or in Delaware.  Perhaps the North Carolina Business Court’s 
presence in North Carolina has added an option for companies in 
surrounding states. 
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